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Articles
Kaplow and Shavell and the
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DAVID BLANKFEIN-TABACHNICK* & KEVIN A. KORDANA**
This Article rejects a central claim of taxation and private law theory, namely,
Kaplow and Shavell’s prominent thesis that egalitarian social goals are most
efficiently achieved through income taxation and transfer, as opposed to egalitarian
alterations in private law rules. Kaplow and Shavell compare the efficiency of rules of
tort to rules of tax and transfer in meeting egalitarian goals, concluding that taxation
and transfer is always more efficient than other private law legal rules. We argue that
Kaplow and Shavell reach this conclusion only through inattention to the body of
private law that informs the very basis of their discussion: underlying property
entitlements. This Article contends that Kaplow and Shavell’s comparison of rules of
taxation to rules of tort fails to take proper account of the powerful role that
(re)assigning underlying property entitlements plays in achieving egalitarian goals,
even at the level of formal theory. We conclude that, contrary to Kaplow and Shavell’s
prominent claim, as a matter of efficiency, the rules of income taxation and transfer
are not always preferable to alterations in the initial assignment of property
entitlements in achieving distributive or egalitarian goals.
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INTRODUCTION
A central question in the construction of rules for any legal regime
is what demands or values govern which sets of rules or legal doctrines.
In terms of “private law” (for example, property, contract and tort), a
perennial debate has centered on the tension between welfare or wealth
maximization and the distributive consequences of legal rules.1 Consider
a hotel located on a stretch of beach. The governing legal regime will need
to construct property rules about beach access.2 If the legal regime aims

1. See, e.g., Anthony Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980);
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (9th ed. 2014); Todd D. Rakoff, The Five Justices of
Contract Law, 2016 WISC. L. REV. 733 (2016); ADITI BAGCHI, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND CONTRACT, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 193 (Gregory Klass et al. eds., 2014).
2. E.g., State of Oregon ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 672 (Or. 1969) (contemplating
allowing private enclosure of the dry sand portion of the beach, a prescriptive easement, or open access
by way of custom).
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at wealth maximization, perhaps access will be limited to hotel guests.
The privacy may attract wealthy clients and, all things considered,
promote the overall maximization of wealth. On the other hand, if the
legal regime aims to promote the interests of the least well-off, public
access to the beach might be selected as the relevant property rule.
Other such trade-offs abound: In a tort case, a worker has lost his
hand while operating a meat-grinding machine. From a welfare or wealth
maximization perspective, if the Learned Hand balancing test results in
favor of the manufacturer,3 no liability should be imposed. That is,
doctrinally, tort should be constructed so as to impose the cost of the lost
hand on the injured worker, such as through the operation of a doctrine
of contributory negligence.4 However, if the same scenario is considered
from the perspective of the least well-off, more cost might be borne by
the manufacturer to protect workers, even the clumsy or illiterate, from
serious bodily harm. Meeting this alternative concern might demand that
the manufacturer be held liable, such as through the construction of a
doctrine of negligence or product liability.5
Consider yet another example, a landlord and tenant have a dispute
over the condition of rented premises. Perhaps a doctrinal construction
answering to the wealth maximization principle should rule in favor of
the landlord, while one concerned with the position of the least well-off
should rule for the tenant.6 Finally, in another property case, a poor
property-owner is subject to a public taking of her land.7 Again, assume
3. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.)
(balancing cost of precautions versus probability of accident and magnitude of harm).
4. See Masters v. N.Y. Cent. R. Co., 70 N.E.2d 898, 903 (Ohio 1947).
5. Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 271 (2d Cir. 1999) (Calabresi, J.) (affirming the jury’s
verdict imposing liability on manufacturer on the grounds that it “could reasonably find that there
exist people who are employed as meat grinders and who do not know (a) that it is feasible to reduce
the risk with safety guards . . . and (c) that the grinders should be used only with the guards.”); cf.,
Lorenzo v. Wirth, 49 N.E. 1010, 1011 (Mass. 1898) (Holmes, J.) (“A heap of coal on a sidewalk in Boston
is an indication, according to common experience, that there very possibly may be a coal hole to receive
it.”).
6. See Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1079–80 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Wright, J.):
The inequality in bargaining power between landlord and tenant has been well documented.
Tenants have very little leverage to enforce demands for better housing. Various
impediments to competition in the rental housing market, such as racial and class
discrimination and standardized form leases, mean that landlords place tenants in a take it
or leave it situation. The increasingly severe shortage of adequate housing further increases
the landlord’s bargaining power and escalates the need for maintaining and improving the
existing stock. Finally, the findings by various studies of the social impact of bad housing
has led to the realization that poor housing is detrimental to the whole society, not merely
to the unlucky ones who must suffer the daily indignity of living in a slum . . . In our
judgment the common law itself must recognize the landlord’s obligation to keep his
premises in a habitable condition.
Id.
7. See Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005):
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that wealth maximization, beyond mere transaction costs, requires that
the seizure of property proceed, but distributive concerns for the least
well-off will demand an outcome in favor of the property owner. These
examples illustrate the pervasive nature of the tension between wealth
maximization and distributive concerns, and the necessity for law to
adjudicate between these competing values.
The examples above, drawn from tort and property law, illustrate
that the substance of private law is closely implicated in the distributive
pattern of wealth. This connection between private law structures and
public distributive values is so pervasive that legal scholars acknowledge
the difficulty of isolating exactly where in law any such distinction lies,
and to what extent particular bodies of law represent public versus
private values.8
Noted legal scholars Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell famously
offer an ingenious solution to this conundrum. Their claim is that, even
if one is committed to the welfare of the least well-off members of society,
the rules of private law should nonetheless be constructed with the aim

Two polar propositions are perfectly clear. On the one hand, it has long been accepted that
the sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another
private party B, even though A is paid just compensation. On the other hand, it is equally
clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future ‘use by
the public’ is the purpose of the taking; the condemnation of land for a railroad with
common-carrier duties is a familiar example.
Id.
For cases with even clearer equity-welfare tensions, consider Columbia University’s dispute with its
neighbors, including a modest auto-repair shop, see Robin Finn, Pushing Back as Columbia Moves to
Spread Out, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2008), as well as China’s recent experience in deploying ‘takings’ to
expand economic growth. Michael Wines & Jonathan Ansfield, Trampled in a Land Rush, Chinese
Resist, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2010) (“The country’s property boom has spawned new cities, remade
older ones and¾not incidentally¾helped float the buoyant economy that is a bedrock of Communist
Party legitimacy. But its benefits are spread unevenly.”).
8. Leon Green, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, 38 TEX. L. REV. 257, 257 (1960); Charles A.
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (calling the bounds of the traditional distinction
into question); Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, On Belling the Cat: Rawls and Tort as
Corrective Justice, 92 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1289 (2006) (“[t]here is no principled or foundational
distinction in Rawls between public and private matters; for Rawls, freedom and the private realm are
constructed by the principles of justice.”); Thomas Scanlon has distinguished between legal rules or
legal rights and underlying values, maintaining that legal rules and rights can take many forms, but
must ultimately be designed to account for the correct balance of values or principles:
Rights, understood as institutional constraints and prerogatives, can “clash” . . . What we
need to do in such a case is to adjust our understanding of these [legal] rights so as to make
them coherent. This adjustment is not best understood, I think, as a matter of ‘balancing’
[legal] rights against one another . . . . It is true, however, that in deciding which
readjustment of these [legal] rights to accept, we may need to “balance” certain
values . . . against one another . . . . [V]alues are balanced, [legal] rights are adjusted, or
redefined.
T. M. Scanlon, Adjusting Rights and Balancing Values, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1477, 1478–79 (2004).
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of wealth maximization. Any distributive pattern is more efficiently met
through the use of income taxation and its inverse, equity-oriented
income transfer, rather than through the construction and deployment
of more egalitarian private law rules.9 Kaplow and Shavell’s prominent
conclusion calls into question the wisdom of directly focusing on the
needs of the least well-off in constructing rules of private law. To be clear,
they address the efficiency of the competing means of achieving
distributive goals, and not the desirability of egalitarian goals
themselves.
Kaplow and Shavell’s claim is significant. If their conclusion is
correct, equity-oriented private law rules can be best understood as
inefficient, though well-intentioned, means to achieve egalitarian
political goals. This implicates a vast range of law and legal doctrine:
minimum wage laws,10 much of landlord-tenant doctrine,11 substantive
unconscionability,12 many nonjudicial remedies for past injustices (that
is government established minority “set-asides” in contracting,13
reparations for slavery or Jim Crow14 or affirmative action programs in
hiring and education15), protection of pregnancy and maternity in an
employment relationship,16 the invocation of the “role model” theory in
educational hiring,17 and section 1981 legislation.18 Kaplow and Shavell

9. LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 35–37 (2002) [hereinafter
FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE]; Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?
Clarifying the Role of Legal Rules and the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
821, 821 (2000) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?]; Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 669 (1994) [hereinafter Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less
Efficient]; see also Steven Shavell, A Note on Efficiency vs. Distributional Equity in Legal Rule
Making: Should Distributional Equity Matter Given Optimal Income Taxation?, 71 AM. ECON. REV.
414 (1981).
10. For a discussion of efficiency, fairness, and their implications for the scope of minimum wage
laws, see generally Christine Jolls, Fairness, Minimum Wage Law and Employee Benefits, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 47 (2002).
11. See Javins, 428 F.2d at 1071.
12. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449–50 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Wright, J.).
13. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–99 (1989).
14. E.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in
America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279 (2003).
15. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
16. Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family
Inequalities, 102 VA. L. REV. 79 (2016); Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction: History and the
Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 492–93 (2011).
17. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(A) (2009):
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every
State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to
the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
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counsel against the use of private law rules and instead favor the use of
income taxation and transfer.
Contemporary political liberalism typically demands that political
and economic institutions reflect, in some measure, equity-oriented
distributive aims.19 But, as previously mentioned, legal scholars disagree
over which institutions should be designated to serve the goals of
distributive principles. Some argue that equity-oriented values are best
served not only by a system of taxation and transfer, but also by the
application of other legal rules, such as the rules of contract and tort.20
Other scholars, agreeing with Kaplow and Shavell, argue that, for
efficiency reasons, non-tax and transfer legal rules ought to be
constructed to maximize wealth, and demand that these rules be
sanitized of equity-oriented values. These scholars maintain that those
egalitarian values are most efficiently met by a system of income taxation
and transfer. It is important to note that this controversy is not over
differing conceptions of political liberalism, or the distributive principles
they bear. Instead, the dispute takes as given the equity-oriented
institutional demands of distributive principles associated with various
forms of contemporary egalitarian liberalism. The controversy, then, is
distinctly over institutional design; namely, the question of which aspects

taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
19. E.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); Samuel Freeman,
Illiberal Libertarians: Why Libertarianism is Not a Liberal View, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 105 (2002);
THOMAS NAGEL, EQUALITY AND PARTIALITY (1991); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
20. E.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 276–312 (1986) (for at least tort law if not contract
law); Patrick Emerton & Kathryn James, The Justice of the Tax Base and the Case for Income Tax, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TAX LAW 125 (Monica Bhandari ed., 2017); LYN K L TJON SOEI LEN,
MINIMUM CONTRACT JUSTICE: A CAPABILITIES PERSPECTIVE ON SWEATSHOPS AND CONSUMER CONTRACTS
(2017); Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes,
Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093 (1971); Aditi Bagchi,
Distributive Justice and Private Law, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 105, 107 (2008); Guido Calabresi, The New
Economic Analysis of Law: Scholarship, Sophistry, or Self-Indulgence?, 68 PROC. BRITISH ACAD. 85,
95–96 (1982); Daniela Caruso, Contract Law and Distribution in the Age of Welfare Reform, 49 ARIZ.
L. REV. 665, 668 (2007); Josse Klijnsma, Contract Law as Fairness, 28 RATIO JURIS 68, 74 (2015);
Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Taxation, the Private Law, and Distributive Justice, 23
SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 142, 146 (2006); Robert K. Rasmussen, An Essay on Optimal Bankruptcy Rules
and Social Justice, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 3–5 (1994) (arguing that bankruptcy, but not, for example,
tort law, should be set to wealth-maximization); Chris Sanchirico, Taxes Versus Legal Rules as
Instruments for Equity: A More Equitable View, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 797, 800 (2000); Samuel Scheffler,
Distributive Justice, the Basic Structure and the Place of Private Law, 35 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 213
(2015); Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deterrence and Corrective
Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1802, 1831 (1997) (“[d]eterrence can [serve] . . . the somewhat austere
goal of economic efficiency, [it] also has deep roots in a humane and compassionate view of the law’s
functions [and continues] But if accident prevention is an economic goal, it is also a generous, warmhearted, compassionate, and humane goal. As such, it is a goal that can be and is in fact supported by
a broad range of scholars.”); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policymaking in an Imperfect World, 92
MICH. L. REV. 336, 338–40 (1993); Kronman, supra note 1.
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of economic, legal and political institutions most efficiently serve the
equity-oriented demands of liberalism.
Kaplow and Shavell’s claim that political liberalism’s distributive
demands are most efficiently met though income taxation and transfer is
one of the most prominent claims in private law and tax policy
scholarship.21 If correct, the claim invites the conclusion that
contemporary egalitarian liberals ought to adopt the wealth-maximizing
conception of private law and achieve all desired equity-oriented
demands through income taxation and transfer. The truth of this
theoretical claim would have wide ranging ramifications for public policy
and “real world” legal and political institutions. The claim purports to
prescribe a rare efficiency-improving option to political liberalism.22
There have been criticisms of Kaplow and Shavell’s claim at the
practical or policy level. We will briefly discuss these criticisms below,
however, our critique engages primarily with their theoretical claim.
Chris Sanchirico relaxes the assumption that individuals are equally
able to exercise the care needed to avoid accidents.23 If the least-skilled
(in terms of producing income) are also the most likely to commit torts,
Sanchirico finds that tort damages should be set below the level that is
maximally efficient to wealth-creation,24 given that one’s conception of
liberalism involves a commitment to equity-oriented values. Christine

21. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 117 n.8 (3d ed. 2002)
(“Should private law take into account the wealth of litigants involved in a particular civil case? Most
law-and-economics scholars argue it should not, on the grounds that private-law rules are inferior
distributive mechanisms compared to broader tax and welfare programs.”) (citing Kaplow & Shavell,
Should Legal Rules Favor the Poor?, supra note 9); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 112 (3d ed. 2000); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 124
(2d ed. 1989); Robert C. Ellickson, The Affirmative Duties of Property Owners: An Essay for Tom
Merrill, 3 BRIGHAM-KANNER PROP. RTS. CONF. J. 43, 66 (2014) (“[m]ost law-and-economics
scholars . . . conclude that distributive goals are better pursued by means of broad tax and welfare
programs than by the introduction of distributive considerations into the rules for resolving ordinary
private law disputes.”) [hereinafter Ellickson, The Affirmative Duties of Property Owners]; Lee Anne
Fennell & Richard H. McAdams, The Distributive Deficit in Law and Economics, 100 MINN. L. REV.
1051, 1062 (2016) (“Our sense today is that both the K&S result and the policy advice have become the
conventional wisdom, at least among many law professors who employ economic analysis.”); Kyle
Logue & Ronen Avraham, Redistributing Optimally: Of Tax Rules, Legal Rules, and Insurance,
56 TAX L. REV. 157 (2003); Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Redistributive Legal
Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1654 (1998) (“Many law and economics scholars have urged that legal
rules be chosen solely with an eye towards Kaldor-Hicks efficiency . . . these scholars often urge that
distributional considerations be addressed (if they are to be addressed at all) exclusively through the
tax and welfare systems.”) (citing Kaplow and Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient, supra
note 9).
22. See James M. Buchanan, The Relevance of Pareto Optimality, 6 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 341
(1962); Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J. 1211,
1212 (1991).
23. Sanchirico, supra note 20, at 801–02.
24. Sanchirico, supra note 20, at 818.
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Jolls has called attention to the fact that, given the insights of behavioral
economics, equal (expected) amounts of (re)distribution via taxation and
the tort system may not cause equivalent effects on work effort,25 as
Kaplow and Shavell assume. Richard Markovits has objected to Kaplow
and Shavell’s conclusion regarding tax and transfer not only on moral
grounds, but also argues that certain qualifications to their argument are,
empirically, quite important.26 In a recent article,27 Lee Anne Fennell and
Richard H. McAdams make a critique that is grounded in a transaction
cost (and political action cost) analysis. They do not, however, engage
with Kaplow and Shavell’s theoretical claim.28
This Article addresses an essential aspect of Kaplow and Shavell’s
argument which appears to be incompletely understood:29 the manner in
which the most fundamental legal rules are constructed, that is the rules
which define entitlements and property arrangements, the very question
of what counts as property, and the role that transaction costs play in
making proper property assignments. This Article addresses the question
of the form that property rules might take; that is, the question of
whether equity-oriented values are most efficiently met entirely through
income taxation and transfer, or, to some degree, through the selection
of the rules of property and entitlement. Kaplow and Shavell’s purported
efficiency advantage of tax and transfer is cast as a comparison of tax and
transfer to individual rules of tort or contract,30 without attention to the
selection of underlying property arrangements, thereby generating the
broad conclusion that tax and transfer is preferable because it is most
efficient. However, each body of law, whether contract, tort, or taxation,
requires underlying property rules that define the details of ownership.
We argue that Kaplow and Shavell’s conclusion that income taxation and
transfer is most efficient has failed to properly take into account these
underlying property rules, and for this reason, it should be rejected. This
Article argues that maximal efficiency in meeting equity-oriented
distributive aims will, at times, demand that such aims be met via
non-tax and transfer legal rules, such as those of property and basic
entitlement.

25. Jolls, supra note 21, at 1656–67.
26. Richard S. Markovits, Why Kaplow and Shavell’s “Double-Distortion Argument” Articles Are
Wrong, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 511, 519–20 (2005).
27. Fennell & McAdams, supra note 21.
28. Id. at 1056–57 (distinguishing between Kaplow and Shavell’s formal theoretical claim and
policy prescriptions and stating “we do not take issue with” the former).
29. See Zachary Liscow, Note, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule Design
Should Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2478 (2014); see also infra notes
81–88 and accompanying text.
30. E.g., Polinsky, supra note 21, at 124.
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To illustrate this point, return to our first example concerning beach
access (based on the Oregon case of Thornton v. Hay31). Assume that the
applicable legal regime was initially aimed at wealth maximization,
limiting beach access to hotel guests. However, perhaps the political
process has changed the nature of the legal regime, such that it now aims
to maximize the position of the least advantaged of society. Kaplow and
Shavell’s advice would be to retain the limited beach access, and to limit
the pursuit of welfare for the disadvantaged to tax and transfer. But this
cannot always be the correct advice. By abandoning the pursuit of wealth
maximization, the new legal regime will, by definition, feature less
wealth, but also improved equality. This may entail fewer wealthy
vacationers, making it suboptimal to devote the entire beach to hotel
guests. A new property rule may be called for, allowing for some public
access. This new property entitlement may not emerge through contract.
Thus, in these circumstances, the legal regime pursuing the new
maximand must alter the property rule governing beach access in order
to promote the interests of the least well-off. Legal rules, other than those
related to tax, must respond to an increased interest in distributional
outcomes.
I. KAPLOW AND SHAVELL
A. KAPLOW AND SHAVELL’S ARGUMENT
Kaplow and Shavell’s argument has a clear and intuitive appeal:
whatever equity-oriented distribution might be obtained through
harnessing legal rules could also be obtained through a system of income
taxation and transfer.32 The use of non-tax and transfer legal rules,
however, has additional inefficiencies associated with it. That is, it

31. State of Oregon ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969).
32. Kaplow and Shavell’s argument assumes that individuals maximize expected utility, Kaplow
& Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient, supra note 9, at 678. They do not, however, appear
to hold (unrealistically) that the conditions under which the Coase Theorem applies are in place across
the entire range of private legal rules. “The result might appear to depend on some features of the
utility function¾notably, risk neutrality, the lack of income effects, and care being independent of
ability. Relaxing these assumptions would make determination of the efficient legal rule more
complicated. It would remain true, however, that if the redistribution accomplished through an
inefficient legal rule were instead achieved through a modification of the tax system, resources would
be saved and all individuals could be made better off.” Supra note 9, 679. Thus, the Coase Theorem’s
assumption of no wealth effects is not assumed in Kaplow and Shavell’s discussion. They do not
mention perfect information or zero transaction costs (which imply no strategic bargaining),
assumptions which would be very strong indeed across the range of all legal rules, particularly once
one considers property regimes, where bargaining and information problems are endemic. Cf. Herbert
Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 782, 787 (1990). One
cannot assume, therefore, in the context of Kaplow and Shavell’s analysis, assets find themselves
assigned to their highest value use through private bargaining.
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achieves its distributive goal by affecting economic activity in ways other
than through the direct redistribution of income (tax and transfer’s only
direct effect).33 Tax and transfer, Kaplow and Shavell argue, is more
efficient in meeting equity-oriented aims than is the harnessing of other
legal rules because tax and transfer creates fewer economic “distortions”
than, for example, the use of tort, which not only would redistribute
income, but also would be departing from optimal deterrence.
Redistribution of income away from the wealth-maximizing outcome,
whether done via taxation or tort, creates economic “dead-weight loss.”
But according to Kaplow and Shavell, tort imposes the added burden of
inefficiently altering standards of due care.34
Kaplow and Shavell’s analysis considers the use of a tort rule to
transfer wealth from the better-off to the less well-off in order to satisfy
equity-oriented demands. Tort liability for the less well-off might be
reduced, leaving them with more money than they would otherwise have,
were they subject to a more optimally wealth-maximizing liability rule.
Such a move, however, in addition to effecting some amount of efficiency
loss during the transfer and the attendant impact on work and
investment incentives, would deviate from optimal deterrence.35 The
result is that the less-advantaged would, on average, use less than the
optimal standard of care, resulting in a sociallyinefficient increase in
accidents. Contrast this scenario with one that uses income taxation and
transfer to achieve the identical equity-oriented distributive end. In that
scenario, one also creates the standard inefficiency associated with
taxation,36 namely, the “distortion” of the investment incentive and
labor-leisure trade-off,37 but not the “additional” loss from nonoptimal
incentives to take due care. This additional loss is what one might
describe as a “double distortion.”
The argument goes, when legal rules are constructed to maximize
wealth, and equity-oriented demands are to be met solely through
taxation and transfer, maximal efficiency will be achieved. This
arrangement is purportedly conducive to the creation of additional
wealth, which may, in turn, be taxed in service to distributive aims.

33. Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient, supra note 9, at 667.
34. Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient, supra note 9, at 669.
35. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J.); WILLIAM
M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987).
36. While Kaplow and Shavell focus on the labor-leisure tradeoff, Kaplow & Shavell, Why the
Legal System Is Less Efficient, supra note 9, at 670–71 n.5, this effect can be seen as an example of
the broader case in which increasing income tax rates leads to decreasing net taxable income. See
Martin Feldstein, The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income, 103 J. POL. ECON. 551,
552–55 (1995).
37. E.g., Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New
Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1920 (1987).
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Egalitarian liberals would thus be well advised to prefer systems of
income taxation and transfer to address equity-oriented demands. In
order to avoid economic waste (an important constraint in meeting most
plausible distributive aims), egalitarian political liberals ought to adopt a
scheme of wealth-maximizing private law rules, in conjunction with a tax
and transfer scheme that serves any desired equity-oriented distributive
aims.
B.

THE SCOPE OF KAPLOW AND SHAVELL’S CLAIM

Kaplow and Shavell conclude that a rule of taxation is more efficient
than a rule of tort in achieving a given equity-oriented distributive end.38
For the concept of taxation and transfer to make sense, however, one
requires an underlying or initial conception of entitlement. Similarly, the
concepts of injury and redress, the frequent subject of tort doctrine,
require the construction of initial entitlement baselines. The question
then naturally arises: should such entitlement baselines be set in
conformity with the “wealth-maximization” demand, regardless of the
aims of the overall scheme? If Kaplow and Shavell understand such
entitlement baselines to be among what they describe as “other” non-tax
and transfer “legal rules,”39 then the answer is yes. Alternatively, should
such entitlement baselines be set so as to directly achieve any given
distributional goals in the first instance? Kaplow and Shavell’s
comparison of tax and tort rules fails to address this fundamental
question of entitlement.
All political and legal institutions are constructed by legal rules.
Kaplow and Shavell’s discussion isolates a particular subset of legal rules
(namely, the rules of income taxation and transfer), and contrasts their
efficiency in achieving equity-oriented distributive aims with the private
law rules of tort. Their argument considers such tort rules one at a time,
much like the way in which a court, while deciding individual cases,
might consider crafting a legal rule. Kaplow and Shavell directly address
rules involving negligence or other risk, and they appear to presume their
argument can be adapted to extend to other rules (such as minimum
wage laws).40 However, Kaplow and Shavell never address the general
case. Further, they are silent about the form property rules, which
necessarily underlie their analysis take; thereby introducing significant
ambiguity.
Kaplow and Shavell claim that “[f]or purposes of [their argument],
the term ‘legal rules’ refers to rules other than those that define the

38. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 667.
39. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 667 n.1.
40. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 674 n.10.
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income tax and welfare system.”41 They understand the term non-tax and
transfer “legal rules” broadly. The very rules that inform or constitute
taxation, that is, rules of property and entitlement, are therefore to be
understood as among “all other legal rules.”42 Their discussion of income
taxation, analytically speaking, takes place against the background of this
constitutive set of legal rules that defines the details of property
ownership.
Our concern is the very question of the form that entitlement rules
that define and inform their discussion of tort or tax are to take. An
argument that compares taxation to a rule of tort, isolated from any
conception of entitlement, and concludes that tax and transfer is superior
to all other legal rules in terms of its economic efficiency, is incomplete.
Our point is that Kaplow and Shavell’s argument requires, and turns
upon, a conception of property. Kaplow and Shavell’s contrast, therefore,
cannot be limited to a comparison of the rules of tort and the rules of tax
and transfer. Since it is clear that legal rules construct the background of
property ownership and markets that form the very basis of Kaplow and
Shavell’s discussion of tort and tax, what their claim requires is an
efficiency comparison of competing sets of property entitlement rules, in
conjunction with a change in the rules of income taxation and transfer.
In other words, in order to draw Kaplow and Shavell’s conclusion, what
is required is not the singular comparison of rules of tort with rules of
income taxation, but rather the comparison of complete schemes of rules,
inclusive of entitlement, income taxation, and tort.
II. KAPLOW AND SHAVELL AND POSSIBLE PROPERTY CONCEPTIONS
While it is clear that, for Kaplow and Shavell, property and rules of
entitlement lie under the rubric of non-tax and transfer legal rules, it is
not clear from their discussion which of many forms these rules should
take. Kaplow and Shavell directly discuss constructing the rules of tort in
service to the wealth maximization principle, but their discussion of
income taxation and tort also requires an account of basic entitlement.43
It would appear that there are two plausible property conceptions open
to Kaplow and Shavell. First, they may simply believe that the majority
of property rules are to be understood in a conventional manner,
meaning their analysis may simply take the set of specific property rules
of any legal system as given. In other words, one possible position is that
given any actual system of property law, income taxation and transfer

41. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 667 n.1.
42. Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 667 n.1.
43. Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient, supra note 9, at 672.
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can more efficiently achieve an equity-oriented end than can the rules of
tort.
Second, Kaplow and Shavell might believe that, while a narrow
range of basic entitlements should be constructed by the demands of
non-wealth-maximizing values, the remaining, expansive domain of
property law should be governed by the wealth maximization principle.
There is significant support in Kaplow and Shavell’s own work (as well as
in the law and economics literature, more generally44) of the view that
the wealth maximization principle should not properly be understood to
apply to the entirety of property and entitlement, even in the context of a
scheme of legal rules otherwise aimed at wealth maximization. This
position, now dominant in the law and economics literature, may help
explain Kaplow and Shavell’s omission of a direct discussion of property
in their analysis of legal rules. Kaplow and Shavell, as well as many other
law and economics scholars (that is, wealth-maximizing theorists), have
been drawn to a less-than-general conception of the wealth maximization
principle, one which specifically exempts “basic entitlement” from its
domain, such as those entitlements typically understood as fundamental
constitutional rights, self-ownership, and security in one’s person. These
limitations arise for a variety of reasons: some pragmatic, others
conceptual and normative. This view holds that any expansive or detailed
account of property rules must, in conjunction with all other rules (other
than those of income taxation and transfer), be constructed in service to
the wealth maximization principle, while leaving the details of more basic
entitlements subject to some other values. In the next section of this
Article, we will address the important ramifications and difficulties that
the application of either of these two property conceptions have for
Kaplow and Shavell’s claim.

44. Kaplow and Shavell, for example, concede that wealth-maximization is not a principle for
general application and that distributive concerns may be appropriately applied in certain settings.
They write, “there are sound reasons for much normative economic analysis of law not to take explicit
account of the distribution of income . . . If these reasons are inapplicable in a particular setting, a
proper welfare economic analysis will take distributional concerns exogenous to wealth maximization
itself, adding “to compute wealth, one must know the prices of into account.” FAIRNESS VERSUS
WELFARE, supra note 9, at 35. They write, “wealth—and thus wealth maximization—is not a welldefined concept,” and, seemingly recognizing the necessity of a property baseline different goods and
services, yet there is no natural set of prices to use.” Supra note 9, 35–36. Kaplow and Shavell then go
on to discuss Richard Posner’s view of one such setting in which the wealth maximization principle
ought not to apply—namely, initial property arrangements. Id. at 35–36 n.41 (quoting Posner, “stating
‘I concede the incompleteness of “wealth” [because] the concept of wealth is dependent on the
assignment of property rights.’”).
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A. THE CONVENTIONALIST VIEW OF PROPERTY
Again, the first possible understanding of Kaplow and Shavell’s view
is that a significant portion of property is simply understood as
conventional or given.45 Their claim might be understood to say that, for
whatever property regime is in place, any equity-oriented distributional
demand of that system can most efficiently be met through income
taxation and transfer, compared to other non-property legal rules. Their
advice, then, for purposes of institutional design, would be that in order
to efficiently achieve a given equitable aim, the only legal doctrine one
should manipulate is the income tax rate. In this view, their analysis takes
as given that property arrangements are simply held constant.
As we have seen, there are reasons for narrowing the scope of the
wealth maximization principle so as to exclude many property
entitlements from its domain. Scholars have at times maintained that the
wealth maximization imperative is best understood as incomplete as
opposed to being a foundational or general normative principle.46 Under
this view, wealth maximization does not construct the complete scheme
of basic entitlements. Given the need for a property conception, this may,
then, yield the conclusion that, for Kaplow and Shavell, property
entitlements are to be best understood conventionally, or simply as
given.
However, consider the ramifications that such an approach would
have for Kaplow and Shavell’s claim. If property rules are to be
understood conventionally (that is, taken as one finds them in any given
system), then many inexpensive possibilities for maximizing the position
of the least economically advantaged may be ignored. Kaplow and
Shavell’s conclusion that equity-oriented moves are always more
efficiently made in tax and transfer as opposed to all other legal rules thus
appears to be significantly problematic.
To clarify this point, consider a distributive principle which
demands the maximization of the position of the least well-off.47 Imagine

45. Ezra Rosser, Destabilizing Property, 48 CONN. L. REV. 397, 471 (2015) (discussing the
conventional view of property and how alterations in property entitlement might improve the
well-being of the poor).
46. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 375 (1990); FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE,
supra note 9, at 35 n.41.
47. Rawls famously describes the “difference principle” component of his two principles of justice
as requiring the maximization of the position of the least well-off, subject to lexically prior basic
liberties and equality of opportunity. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 42–43 (Erin
Kelly ed., 2001):
(A) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and (B)
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached
to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and
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that the least well-off own rural land that is nearly valueless, given
currently overbroad environmental rules and regulations. If these
regulations were relaxed, the least well-off would be able to sell this land
for development as a recreational area, perhaps for substantial economic
gain. Given that the environmental regulations are, by stipulation,
overbroad, significant income could be realized by the least well-off at
little cost. The alternative to such a property law rearrangement would
be taxing the wealthy, then transferring the proceeds to the least well-off.
Here, it would seem the income taxation and transfer alternative would,
in contravention to Kaplow and Shavell’s claim, impose a greater cost
through the deadweight loss associated with income taxation than would
shifting the overbroad environmental property rules. In short, the latter
is more efficient to the goals of the scheme. This is particularly true given
the value that could be “unlocked” with a shift away from conventional,
but highly inefficient, property rules.48
The point is that if Kaplow and Shavell assume that significant
entitlements in property should be taken as they are found in any actual
legal system, then their claim ought to be narrowed so as to specifically
exclude property law from “other legal rules.” Otherwise, the claim
appears to be false. If their claim of tax and transfer preference over
“other legal rules” were so narrowed to exclude property, then given the
ability of property entitlements to unlock large amounts of value, the
import of the claim is significantly reduced. That said, there is little
reason to believe that all property-oriented rules ought to remain entirely
beyond the scope of legal regulation. For instance, consider the very
purpose of takings cases, which alter property holdings in keeping with
distributive aims.
To make this point plain, consider the implication of this narrow
conventionalist view if one were to compare complete schemes of legal
and political rules constructed in service to differential distributive
principles, for example, changing a wealth maximization scheme to a
more egalitarian scheme committed to maximizing the position of the
least well-off. The Kaplow and Shavell position on how best to change the
rules of the scheme, given the new distributive principle, would be, of
course, to alter only income taxation and transfer to satisfy the new, more
equity-oriented principle. If, as we are assuming, one is to take the rules
of property entitlement as they are found, this would imply that no
change in property entitlements should occur. Our insight, however,
second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society (the
difference principle).
48. See, e.g., Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs, in THE WEST
AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 49–50 (2000) (discussing important role of property titling as improving

position of urban poor by making borrowing possible).
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amounts to the claim that a change in the overall distributive goal of the
scheme necessitates that all the rules of the new scheme are to be
constructed so as to maximize the position of the least well-off.
To conclude, Kaplow and Shavell’s claim, broadly understood,
cannot be true if the rules of property are not set in accordance with
distributive principles; setting property rules according to norms other
than wealth maximization or working from the property rules in a
“conventional” legal setting would be sufficient to show the over-breadth
of their claim. Still, the problem with holding “property” as conventional
goes deeper: If one is to “freeze” property entitlements as they are found
in existing legal regimes, it is not clear what Kaplow and Shavell are
comparing when they measure the relative “distortion” involved in
implementing a rule of “income taxation” versus a rule of “tort” to achieve
a given distributive end.49 Both tax and tort significantly impact
entitlements. For example, my entitlement right in my automobile is
relatively stronger when the income I generate from collecting taxicab
fares is untaxed versus when it is taxed, and when third parties are liable
for damaging it versus when they are entitled to damage it in certain
circumstances without liability. So if my entitlement in my automobile is
to be held constant in a conventional sense, it would appear that altering
any relevant rules of taxation and of tort would also be blocked. In short,
it appears that if Kaplow and Shavell mean to take property entitlements
as fixed or given, their claim is incoherent. They must, then, have in mind
that at least much of property law is to be set to or in some measure
answer to wealth maximization and not be taken as conventionally given
by any actual legal system.
B.

BASIC ENTITLEMENTS AND A WEALTH-MAXIMIZING PROPERTY REGIME

The question of what exactly a wealth-maximizing property law
scheme looks like is, itself, problematic. Even if most of what is
doctrinally labeled as “property law” is subjected to wealth maximization,
scholars have drawn attention to pragmatic, conceptual, and normative
reasons that would seem to require a narrowing of the scope of the wealth
maximization principle, such that it would not encompass all property
entitlements. Specifically, scholars in the law and economics vein have
been drawn to a constrained conception of the wealth maximization
principle. Many scholars hold that the very concept of “wealth” is
incomplete.50 That is, in order to evaluate prices or discern economic
49. Kaplow & Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient, supra note 9, at 674.
50. Richard Posner has emphasized “that wealth maximization is inherently incomplete as a
guide to social action because it has nothing to say about the distribution of rights¾or at least nothing
we want to hear . . . . If wealth maximization is indifferent to the initial distribution of rights, it is a
truncated concept of justice.” POSNER, supra note 46, at 375.
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value, one must first set entitlement baselines.51 Such baselines must be
established, conceptually, prior to the very concept of wealth and, thus,
the wealth maximization principle. The idea is that it would be illogical
to speak of wealth absent an initial assignment of property rights; and if
this is correct, the wealth maximization principle cannot govern such
arrangements, making any such argument incoherent.52
Although these conceptual reasons tend to be grouped among or
alongside the normative reasons for the rejection of the wealth
maximization principle as a guide to the construction of property and
entitlement rules in the literature, they are actually distinct. That is, even
if one were to show that this baseline problem could be overcome¾say,
by assigning initial entitlements to those who will make the most of them
and measuring wealth on an objective index¾there still would be strong
normative reasons for rejecting the notion that wealth maximization
should govern the entire assignment of property entitlements. Even if the
economic analysis of law could produce a wealth-maximizing conception
of property which does not fall prey to conceptual incoherence, wealth
maximization scholars have concluded that one still needs to show that a
“through and through” wealth-maximizing conception of property would
be normatively acceptable.
Indeed, in the context of significant debate, some law and economics
scholars have maintained that applying the wealth-maximization
principle to the most basic of property entitlements is objectionable on
normative grounds. They argue that it may well produce or even demand
normatively unacceptable (deeply illiberal) outcomes.53 The idea is that
conceptions of freedom and equality, self-ownership of one’s body, labor,
thought and conscience, dignitary interests, personal property and a
basic or decent social minimum require property baselines defended on
grounds other than wealth-maximization. Wealth maximization, given
its aim of maximal net aggregate wealth, is consistent with, and may even

51. Lewis A. Kornhauser, Wealth Maximization, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 679 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Mark A. Geistfeld, Due Process and the
Determination of Pain and Suffering Tort Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 349 n.65 (2006) (“The
appropriate baseline cannot be determined by economic analysis, since cost-benefit analysis depends
on prices which in turn depend on the initial allocation of property rights . . . . The initial allocation of
property rights must instead depend upon [other] normative justification, and so the normatively
justified tort rule defines the appropriate baseline for evaluating the distributive impact.”); FAIRNESS
VERSUS WELFARE, supra note 9, at 36.
52. See LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE (2002).
53. “Given the distribution of rights (whatever it is), wealth maximization can be used to derive
the policies that will maximize the value of those rights. But this does not go far enough, because
naturally we are curious about whether it would be just to start off with a society in which, say, one
member owned all the others.” POSNER, supra note 46, at 375.
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demand, troublingly illiberal property arrangements, including but not
limited to, as Rawls points out, chattel slavery.54
The basic idea here is that wealth maximization, like utilitarianism,
fails to seriously consider the moral distinction between persons.
Interestingly, it is the recognition of this point that leads Rawls to develop
a theory of basic liberties and their priority to economic arrangements.55
Law and economics scholars typically resolve this problem by narrowing
the scope of the wealth maximization principle, requiring that
non-wealth-maximizing values are at play in defining a narrow set of
basic entitlements, thereby ultimately accepting what might be described
as constrained wealth maximization.56 There are, then, good reasons to
believe that Kaplow and Shavell do not hold that all property
arrangements are to be subject to the wealth maximization principle.
Instead, it would appear that they hold that some narrow class of basic
property
entitlements
are
to
be
directly
set
via
non-wealth-maximizing (that is, equity-oriented) values, leaving the rest
of property law to be governed by wealth maximization.
A normative requirement that some basic entitlements reflect
equity-oriented values is the rejection of a thoroughgoing wealth
maximization in favor of a more equity-oriented, constrained
wealth-maximizing principle. That is, the wealth maximization principle
is abandoned in favor of suffusing basic entitlements with distinct, and
more importantly, equity-oriented values. In favoring a more
equity-oriented conception, Kaplow and Shavell appear not to hold that
all equity-oriented moves are to be made in tax and transfer, but would

54. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 8.
55. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 243–44; JOHN RAWLS, The Basic Liberties and Their Priority, in
POLITICAL LIBERALISM 291 (1993). For similar points, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1977); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 958 (1982) (discussing
“strand of liberal property theory that focuses on personal embodiment or self-constitution in terms
of ‘things.’”); Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
227 (1980).
56. POSNER, supra note 46; FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE, supra note 9, at 35 n.41, 35–37. Indeed,
a commitment to “constrained wealth maximization” may be more complicated than it initially
appears. The range of values that motive a constraint on wealth maximization may not be so easily
placed to one side or “cabined-off” to a few basic property entitlements such as self-ownership, thereby
leaving the wealth maximization principle otherwise free to operate. Consider for example, defamation
law, conventionally understood as a rule of tort law. Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890) (discussing common law of defamation). On the plausible
assumption that the same values that cause one to reject the possibility of (wealth-maximizing) chattel
slavery may to require some measure of protection from defamation that might not be constructed
under wealth maximization, the basic entitlement scheme might thus intrude into tort law itself, which
would then be, importantly, in part non wealth-maximizing. For the sake of argument, however, we
will proceed as if basic entitlements only involve a few rules of property law, as appears to be Kaplow
and Shavell’s position.
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instead include some such moves in the basic entitlement component of
property law rules.
Given that, as we have argued above, Kaplow and Shavell’s claim
cannot be correct if it posits that property should be taken as merely
conventional, it would seem that they hold that the non-basic aspects of
entitlement should respond to the same maximand as does, for example,
tort¾namely, wealth maximization. Since Kaplow and Shavell, to their
credit, have noted the deeply problematic nature of extending the range
of the wealth maximization principle to cover basic entitlements (which,
as we have said, would call into question the status of self-ownership,
freedom of conscience, and constitutional essentials), they place these
matters under the control of non-wealth-maximizing, equity-oriented
values.57 With these basic matters left to one side, Kaplow and Shavell
thus hold a “constrained wealth-maximizing” view of property: legal
rules of basic entitlement are governed by non-wealth-maximizing
values, while all other (non-tax and transfer) legal rules are to be
constructed by appeal to wealth maximization. In this constrained
wealth-maximizing view, conventional or “positive” accounts of property
are rejected and the expansive or non-basic rules of property are
constructed in service to the wealth maximization principle.58
Since Kaplow and Shavell themselves take as given that some
non-tax and transfer legal rules¾those of basic entitlement¾are to be
constructed in an equity-oriented fashion, their bold conclusion assumes
that some equity-oriented moves must be made in the basic entitlement
component of property law construction. For example, if a particular set
of rules governing minimum wage is demanded or required of any
entitlement scheme that sufficiently protects human dignity, it could be,
in Kaplow and Shavell’s view, justified on exogenous moral (as opposed
to efficiency grounds) since efficiency by their own lights has already
been determined not to be the controlling value in the construction of
rules governing basic entitlement. The existence of equity-oriented
values in the construction of basic entitlements reduces the scope of
Kaplow and Shavell’s claim. The efficiency preference of “tax and
transfer” over “other legal rules” is then limited in range, applying only
to what we have called non-basic entitlement. Given the conceptual and
57. FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE, supra note 9, at 35–37.
58. Note that the basic entitlements adopted as the constraints to a plausible theory of wealth
maximization might not remain unchanged if a new distributive principle were to be implemented. If
such a change in the distributive principle necessitated a change in basic entitlements, then this alone
would be sufficient to refute Kaplow and Shavell’s thesis regarding the tax and transfer preference. In
other words, if the “wealth maximization” basic entitlement package is not maximally efficient at
satisfying a new, more equity-oriented distributive principle, then adoption of such a principle
requires changes in property entitlement.
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normative difficulty with a thoroughgoing wealth maximization
approach to property, difficulties that Kaplow and Shavell themselves
accept, any broader claim is problematic. However, Kaplow and Shavell
may reasonably advance a narrower claim of an efficiency preference for
tax and transfer over all non-basic entitlement legal rules, including the
expansive rules of property law. We will argue, however, that there are
conclusive reasons which demonstrate that the narrow claim that income
taxation and transfer is more efficient in meeting equity-oriented
demands than changes to an expansive property law regime is false, and
should therefore be rejected.
To summarize our argument, we have noted that Kaplow and
Shavell leave the role of property law unattended in making their claim
that income taxation and transfer are superior to “all other legal rules” in
attaining equity-oriented goals. One is left to guess what their conception
of property may be. We reject the possibility that they hold either a
conventional view or a thoroughgoing wealth-maximization view (see
chart below, first row) and conclude that they must hold a constrained
wealth-maximization view. In this view, basic entitlements are set by
equity-oriented values, but expansive property law constructions are
governed by the wealth maximization principle (see chart below, second
row). Since what is essential to a thoroughgoing refutation of Kaplow and
Shavell’s thesis is showing that, as a matter of efficiency (that is,
independent of moral reasons), equity-oriented moves are sometimes
more cheaply made through the rules of expansive property law rather
than through income taxation and transfer (see chart below, third row),
we turn to this issue in the next section.
Property Law: Basic
Entitlements
Distributive
Principle: Wealth
Maximization
Distributive
Principle:
Constrained Wealth
Maximization
Distributive
Principle: Difference
Principle

Property Law:
Expansive
Constructions

Objectionable

Wealth Maximization

Equity-Oriented

Wealth Maximization

Equity-Oriented

K and S claim: Wealth
Maximization; this
claim we refute.
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III. THE PROPERTY LAW REFUTATION OF THE
TAX AND TRANSFER PREFERENCE
A. PROPERTY LAW AND DIFFERING DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES
Different forms of liberalism feature different levels of commitment
to the central liberal values of freedom and equality. In order to illustrate
how legal rules are constructed under different conceptions of liberalism,
let us turn to several examples.
First consider Kaplow and Shavell’s constrained wealth-maximizing
conception. With such a distributive principle, the rules of the complete
scheme of economic institutions are to be arranged instrumentally so as
to maximize net aggregate wealth, subject to the basic entitlement
constraints (or range limitation). The rules of this arrangement of
economic institutions are constructed in service to the over-arching
demands of the distributive end: constrained wealth maximization.
It is important to emphasize that, even within the context of such a
wealth-oriented scheme of legal and political institutions, not all rules
are to be constructed in a way that patterns a “free market” as would be
found in Lockean-libertarianism or in the doctrine of laissez-faire.59 To
be clear, wealth maximization and the doctrine of laissez-faire are not the
same¾in the context of constrained wealth maximization, there is no
principled commitment to values such as near-absolute rights in
holdings and transfer as would be found in a libertarian scheme.
Constrained wealth maximization likely requires some “collectivist” or
state ownership.
For example, consider a scheme of legal institutions in which air
travel has recently been introduced. The assumptions behind the Coase
Theorem,60 of course, would not apply to transactions between airplane
owners and numerous landowners, due to bargaining costs and the
possibility of strategic holdout. But this is not our present concern.
Property rights allowing airplanes to fly overhead might be more
valuably assigned to airlines, given a wealth-maximizing property
scheme, than being left to the discretion of would-be libertarian holders
of fees simple absolute. If this were indeed the case then subsequent to
the introduction of the airplane, wealth-maximizing private law rules

59. ROBERT A. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
60. See R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). The assumptions of the
Coase Theorem include no wealth effects and no transactions or bargaining costs. Elizabeth Hoffman
& Matthew L. Spitzer, Experimental Law and Economics: An Introduction, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 991,
1010 (1985).
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would presumably (1) reduce the ad coelum rights61 of landowners from
the baseline of libertarianism, that is, shave down fees simple absolute
and assign air rights to airlines, (2) change the landowners’ property-rule
protection as against airborne incursions to liability rule protection,62 or
(3) “collectivize” air-rights, with the new government owner allowing
openaccess to airplane owners or perhaps charging a relatively small
usage fee.63
Where the reassignment of property rights “unlocks” net aggregate
wealth, it is required within a set of legal and economic institutions
aimed at wealth maximization, independent of the question of
transaction costs. Once one accepts Kaplow and Shavell’s constrained
wealth maximization principle, there can be no reasonable objection to
the details of this change in property entitlement¾the only real objection
would be to the constrained wealth maximization principle itself, not to
its instantiation in this particular instance in which private property
rights were reduced.64 Our point is that differential governing
distributive principles demand differential property conceptions¾for
example, the move from Lockean-libertarianism to wealth maximization.
As a further example, stipulate that the construction of a public park
in a growing city would be wealth-maximizing; however, the city’s
attempt to secure a suitable plot of land is hampered by a small group of
would-be libertarians refusing to sell land to the city. Constrained wealth
61. For hundreds of years, the common law dictum of cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum
et ad infernos, or “To whomever the soil belong, he owns also to the sky and to the depths” gave
unlimited air-rights to landowners. Ad coelum et ad infernos, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
62. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
63. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946) (“[The] ad coelum . . . . doctrine has no
place in the modern world. The air is a public highway . . . . Were that not true, every transcontinental
flight would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense revolts at the idea. To
recognize such private claims to the airspace would clog these highways [and] seriously interfere with
their control and development in the public interest”); Lord Bernstein of Leigh v. Skyviews & Gen.
Ltd., n.5 [1978] QB 479 (Eng.):
[t]he maxim, usque ad coelum, [is] a fanciful phrase, to which I would add that if applied
literally it is a fanciful notion leading to the absurdity of a trespass at common law being
committed by a satellite every time it passes over a suburban garden. The academic writers
speak with one voice in rejecting the uncritical and literal application of the maxim . . . . I
accept their collective approach as correct. The problem is to balance the rights of an owner
to enjoy the use of his land against the rights of the general public to take advantage of all
that science now offers in the use of air space. This balance is in my judgment best struck in
our present society by restricting the rights of an owner in the air space above his land to
such height as is necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of his land and the structures
upon it, and declaring that above that height he has no greater rights in the air space than
any other member of the public.
64. Murphy & Nagel, supra note 52, at 98; Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman, Tax
Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661, 1663 (1992) (arguing that there are no fixed
baselines in taxation: “The choice among perspectives is a contestable, contingent . . . decision.”).
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maximization, here, might be satisfied by altering these property owners’
rights¾from, for example, property-rule protection to liability-rule
protection¾thus allowing the city to engage in a “taking” of the land and
requiring the provision of fair market compensation. So, to be clear,
constrained wealth maximization might require that the scheme reassign
property rights in a “collectivist” manner in order to increase wealth.
These examples show that a commitment to a constrained wealth
maximization principle has a significant effect on the form that
entitlements in property take (that is, the proverbial “bundle of sticks”).
The point is that commitment to the constrained wealth maximization
principle requires that property entitlements be constructed in service to
its demands. The idea, not a transaction cost story, is that one cannot
succeed in meeting the demands of constrained wealth maximization by
simply adjusting the rules of income taxation and transfer in a direction
more conducive to economic growth, without attention to property
entitlements.
Instead, one would need to construct the rules in conjunction with
one another, so as to produce a complete scheme of legal and economic
institutions that complies with the distributive goal: constrained wealth
maximization. The principle requires an optimal set of property rights
and entitlements, just as it requires an optimal rate of taxation;
importantly, the tax rate in a scheme of legal and political rules governed
by constrained wealth maximization is not zero.
In significant contrast to constrained wealth maximization, consider
a form of liberal egalitarianism that subscribes to Rawls’s “difference
principle,” which demands that the rules of all economic and legal
institutions be arranged so as to maximize the position of the least
well-off, subject to satisfying the lexically prior first principle of justice
and equal opportunity.65 Rawlsianism, of course, measures the position
of the least well-off not in terms of wealth, but by counting what Rawls
calls the objective index of the “primary goods.”66 Importantly, this
means that Kaplow and Shavell’s claim does not, given their
assumptions, apply to Rawlsianism. However, as is often done for
illustrative purposes,67 consider a quasi-Rawlsian approach that seeks to
maximize the position of the least well-off in terms of dollars which, for
the moment, complies with Kaplow and Shavell’s idealizations which are
distinct from Rawls’s. Such a liberal egalitarian approach is analogous to
constrained wealth maximization in that it is instrumentalist and
65. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 75.
66. RAWLS, supra note 19, at 90.
67. E.g., THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 66 (1989) (“Let me give a crude illustration of
Rawls’s position, based, once again, upon his difference principle in its simplest form (where it governs
only income).”).
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maximizing (subject to the first principle of justice and equal
opportunity) with regard to the rules of a complete set of economic
institutions, inclusive of expansive property conceptions, contract,
property, tort, corporate, bankruptcy, and commercial law.68
As in the constrained wealth maximization case, then, here too we
are required to meet the demands of a maximizing principle¾in this
case, one focused on the position of the least well-off. For reasons of
equality, this principle, unlike the wealth maximization principle which
focuses on net aggregate wealth, requires that the position of the least
well-off be maximized. From a wealth maximization perspective, the
difference principle is significantly more equity-oriented and, again, the
rules of the economic scheme are to be constructed in service to its
maximizing demands. So, as in the wealth maximization example,
non-tax and transfer legal rules are constructed, instrumentally and in
conjunction with one another, in service to the new equity-oriented
difference principle. Changing the maximand from focusing on net
aggregate wealth to focusing on the wealth of the position of the least
well-off should require property law to be employed instrumentally in the
direct satisfaction of the scheme’s demands. More precisely, Kaplow and
Shavell hold that in order to meet the demands of the newly governing
difference principle, the expansive rules of property law should be
constructed so as to maximize wealth¾that is, remain constant in an
inter-schemic comparison despite the change in the distributive principle
that governs the entire scheme of legal and economic rules. For Kaplow
and Shavell, only the rate of income taxation and its inverse, the transfer
rate, changes.
The setting of initial property entitlements can have significant
effects on the achievement of the desired ends of an economic scheme.69
Consider again the park example: imagine a complete scheme of legal
and economic rules in which the position of the least well-off would be
improved considerably by adding a park to a crowded neighborhood.
While there might be holdouts or other collective action problems
attendant to acquiring property for the park through voluntary contract,
our point goes deeper. A scheme of property rules focused on maximizing
the position of the least well-off might, then, assign the plot or the right
to purchase it for an objectively determined price to the state, even in the
absence of transaction costs. This would be an equity-oriented rule of

68. See Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 598, 609 (2005).
69. Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to
Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553 (1993); Lloyd Cohen, Holdouts and Free Riders, 20 J. LEGAL STUD.
351 (1991).
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property law, and it would be adopted because it maximizes the position
of the least well-off.
This example demonstrates that property law constructions remain,
in a scheme responding to the difference principle, instrumental to the
service of that principle. Kaplow and Shavell’s claim is that the
satisfaction of the new maximand can be most efficiently achieved by
having the expansive rules of property law ignore the switch in
maximands. That is, the expansive rules of property law are to continue
to respond to a different maximizing distributive principle: One focused
exclusively on net aggregate wealth. Consider, however, the implication
of constructing private law rules so as to maximize net aggregate wealth
in a system subject to the maximizing demands of the difference
principle. The expansive rules of property law function to maximize net
aggregate wealth regardless of their effect on the actual goal of the
overall scheme, which is to maximize the position of the least well-off.
Put this way, the claim is highly counterintuitive: Kaplow and Shavell
would hold that in order to maximize the position of the least well-off,
one is best advised to start by maximizing wealth, making all changes
through income taxation and transfer.
So, property assignments must answer to the demands of the
maximand, which may require certain specified entitlement
assignments. While these assignments might at times solve transaction
cost problems, this is decidedly not our principal point. Assignments
might overcome subjective preferences in order to satisfy the maximand.
Consider a newly developed drone technology that allows low-cost
delivery of pharmaceuticals to underserved neighborhoods. A maximand
that focuses on the position of the least well-off might demand that
drones be able to establish flight paths over wealthy neighborhoods even
if wealthy residents had no interest in selling their air rights. The
reassignment of air rights is not done to solve a transaction cost
problem70¾instead it is done to satisfy a direct demand of the
maximand¾to improve the position of the least well-off.71
B.

ANALYSIS OF THE TAX AND TRANSFER PREFERENCE

It can now be demonstrated why Kaplow and Shavell’s tax and
transfer preference is problematic. The expansive conception of property
law, constructed so as to maximize net aggregate wealth would, by
definition, instantiate a rule that increased net aggregate wealth by 0.5
but which decreased the position of the least well-off by 100. In returning

70. Cf. Fennell & McAdams, supra note 21 at 1057.
71. Analogously, Rawlsian contract law would “close” certain options that would be “open” in
wealth maximization. Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 68, at 598.
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to our initial example, this may mean constructing a property rule
limiting public access to beaches that has the effect of increasing
beach-front land values and, on net, slightly increasing overall wealth.
However, such a rule comes at a cost to lower-income would-be
beachgoers. This decrease in the position of the least well-off should,
according to Kaplow and Shavell, be “undone” through income taxation
and transfer, even given the latter’s attendant “distortion” of the
labor-leisure trade-off and associated dead-weight loss. However,
crucially, if the “loss” from this distortion (plus administrative and
transactions costs) was greater than 0.5¾given that 100.5 is being
sought to be taxed and transferred¾then the scheme would do better to
have avoided adopting that particular wealth-maximizing property law.
An economic scheme aimed at maximizing the position of the least welloff should not “eke out” every last drop of wealth in its construction of
property law.
This example is sufficient to refute Kaplow and Shavell’s claim. The
outcome, once the issue has been properly framed as involving the
construction of a new scheme of legal and economic rules, subject to a
new maximand, is not terribly surprising. Working at cross-purposes to
an overarching maximizing principle (that is, the difference principle) by
invoking the distinct wealth maximization principle, to govern what we
have shown to be crucial expansive property constructions, seems an
unlikely¾and curious¾way to maximize the position of the least
well-off. We argue that, in a such a scheme governed by a new distributive
principle, many property (re)arrangements that directly improve the
position of the least well-off could be made at a lower cost than through
the use of taxation and transfer¾largely by (re)constructing expansive
property law rules that had been adopted in service to
wealth-maximization but which can now be seen as extremely costly in
terms of the satisfaction of the new, equity-oriented difference principle.
It is significant that these costs or inefficiencies are “new”¾they are
relevant only given the new distributive principle. A reduction in the
position of the least well-off did not count against a rule under the wealth
maximization principle, so long as net aggregate wealth was increased.
Thus, for a given distributive principle, it is simply too “costly,” in
terms of the aims of that principle, to construct a scheme of legal and
economic rules by subjecting (large) portions of the scheme to a distinct
maximand. A maximizing distributive principle, metaphorically
speaking, “sucks the air out of the room.” That is, maximization requires,
in principle, the construction of a complete set of legal and economic
rules that ekes out every bit of value or benefit (however small) in terms
of one distributive principle, to the exclusion of all others. It is far better,
in terms of efficiency, to satisfy an overarching distributive scheme by
constructing all parts of the system to be responsive to a distributive
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principle, as opposed to another aim. In the presence of one maximizing
distributive principle, there is simply no “air” in the system to sustain the
demands of another competing maximizing principle.
As our example demonstrates, setting expansive rules of property
law to wealth-maximize when some other maximizing distributive
principle is in place can be extremely costly, by dramatically increasing
the amount of “redistribution” that needs to be done¾in a manner that
can overwhelm whatever per-unit advantage (from the lack of a “double
distortion”) that taxation may have over the private law in achieving,
intra-schemically, a fixed amount of additional “equity.”
This is not an insignificant point. It is true that where one’s global
aim is the maximization of the least well-off, one must take care not to
destroy the production of wealth. However, it does not follow from this
mere cautionary instruction that all non-tax and transfer legal rules
should be constructed instrumentally to an alternative maximand (that
is, wealth maximization). The important lesson to learn from Kaplow and
Shavell is that when tax and transfer can more efficiently distribute value
to the least well-off than changes in other legal rules, it should be done.
However, such a decision always requires further analysis of the cost of
the imposition of wealth-maximizing legal rules upon the least well-off
(in terms of their own wealth maximization) and the efficiency of
compensating that loss via tax and transfer. It is clear that since various
property assignments within a wealth-maximizing property scheme have
a differential impact on net aggregate wealth, there is no reason a priori
to believe that tax and transfer is more efficient than alterations to
property rules. In any situation where a specific wealth-maximizing rule
within the complete set of legal and economic institutions is contributing
little real value to net aggregate wealth (meaning it creates little revenue
for purposes of taxation) and at the same time serves to reduce the wealth
of the least well-off, a deviation from the wealth-maximizing property
rule will be more efficient than tax and transfer in maximizing the
position of the least well-off. The continued imposition of such property
rules would simply be operating in contravention to the goal of
maximizing the position of the least well-off.
C.

COUNTER-EXAMPLE TO THE TAX AND TRANSFER PREFERENCE

The effect of switching away from constrained wealth maximization
on expansive property constructions illuminates an even greater
difficulty with Kaplow and Shavell’s thesis than our discussion thus far
has suggested. Consider the following example. In service to the demands
of constrained wealth maximization, entitlement to a remote fishery has
been assigned to F, a highly skilled fisherman who is its highest value
owner and will use expensive equipment to harvest caviar from
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sturgeon.72 Now assume that the difference principle has been put in
place. Kaplow and Shavell would advise that one should maximize the
position of the least well-off only through the use of income taxation and
transfer, that is, only the income tax rate (and its inverse transfer rate)
would change; all other legal rules would remain unchanged, in their
constrained wealth maximization construction. Keep in mind, however,
that we cannot assume that the fishery will continue to operate in the new
scheme governed by the difference principle. When we shift the
maximand from constrained wealth maximization to the difference
principle we are, by definition, accepting less net aggregate wealth, or a
smaller economic pie.73 The fact that net aggregate wealth decreases has
an effect on prices within the scheme. For example, the relative price and
proliferation of luxury goods may decline precipitously as compared to
the price of basic commodities. Given this hypothesized drop in the price
of luxury items like caviar, the remote caviar-fishery might best be
abandoned in the new scheme, according to the difference principle’s
demands. The economic activities that are constructed in the new scheme
are different from those constructed in service to the demands of
constrained wealth maximization. Luxurious mansions might need to be
reconfigured into apartments for the least well-off.
It is useful to recall a now-canonical example from property law
scholarship. Demsetz famously argued that one should understand the
transformation from communal holding of property to private land
ownership among the Native Americans in northeastern Canada as a
result of the increased value of furs once the Europeans arrived.74 As the
value of fur increased, the cost of overhunting fur-bearing animals also
increased.75 This made it suddenly cost-effective to bear the costs of
private land-ownership (for example, demarcating and policing
boundaries76), internalizing the externality of overhunting through
communal ownership. The point is that the change in the relative price
of fur necessitated a reconstruction of the bundle of property rights and
entitlements. Another now-canonical example is the invention of barbed
wire which lowered the cost of fencing, and spurred greater subdivision
of land in the American West.77 So too we argue that the change in

72. This appears to be consistent with the assumptions of Kaplow and Shavell’s argument.
“Individuals differ in their ability [alpha] to earn income y through labor effort.” Kaplow & Shavell,
Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient, supra note 9, at 677.
73. See RAWLS, supra note 19, at 71 n.10 (“This fact is generally recognized in welfare economics,
as when it is said that [wealth maximization] is to be balanced against equity.”).
74. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 356–58 (1967)
(Papers and Proceedings).
75. Id.
76. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1327–30 (1993).
77. Id. at 1330.
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relative prices that will occur under a new maximand which has
decreased net aggregate wealth will necessitate the reconstruction of
property entitlements.
The idea is this: if legal and economic institutions are arranged to
maximize wealth, then they are, by definition, arranged such that assets
are in the possession of the highest value user. Thus, such an
arrangement marks the wealth-production ceiling. If expansive property
entitlements are rearranged to maximize the position of the least well-off
instead, the system incurs significant loss in net aggregate wealth, which
cannot be preserved in the newly created property and entitlement
scheme. Kaplow and Shavell would argue that the wealth created for the
least well-off by any alternative property arrangement cannot be greater
than the wealth created by the wealth-maximizing set of property
arrangements, so one might as well use income tax and transfer in
conjunction with wealth-maximizing property rules to maximize the
position of the least well-off. One cannot switch between a wealth
maximization regime and a scheme designed to maximize the position of
the least well-off without significantly altering prices and economic
activity. The economic activity available for taxation in a
wealth-maximizing scheme is not necessarily available for similar
taxation in a scheme arranged to maximize the position of the least welloff. Thus, while a wealth-maximizing scheme requires assigning rights in
the remote fishery to F, one cannot assume that F’s involvement in the
production of a luxury item (caviar) would exist, and thus be available for
similar treatment through taxation once property entitlements are
instead set to maximize the position of the least well-off.
Once taxation and property entitlements are set instrumentally to a
“non-wealth-maximizing” demand, prices and economic activity cannot
be held constant. When one adopts legal rules that aim to maximize the
position of the least well-off, net aggregate wealth is self-consciously
decreased in favor of a specific (more egalitarian) distributive pattern.
This pattern, in turn, creates a new and distinct set of prices. Expansive
property entitlements should not be held constant in drawing
comparisons between complete legal and economic schemes. The
continued assignment of property rights to the now-defunct, though
previously profitable, remote fishery to F is clearly inefficient in
maximizing the position of the least well-off. Such rights should instead
be assigned to someone other than F, perhaps to a local group of
less-skilled people, G, that can engage, for example, in subsistence
fishing, which will in turn be more instrumental to satisfying the
difference principle. Notice that this asset reassignment is required by
the collapse in the caviar market, as compared to an attempt to impose
taxation on a now nonexistent caviar fishery, if one is to satisfy the
demands of the difference principle.
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Thus, the entitlement to the fishery must change when the
maximand has changed from wealth maximization to maximizing the
position of the least well-off. This demonstrates that property rights and
entitlements must be altered in order to most efficiently satisfy the
demands of the new distributive principle. In a scheme governed by
wealth maximization, the fishery is assigned to F. In a scheme governed
by the difference principle, the fishery is instead assigned to G. In
essence, the reassignment of the fishery to G creates more income than
is taken from F. Thus, unlike a rule of income taxation or tort, which
transfer dollars between individuals, the added (or, “double”) distortion
of transferring property assignments can be positive in nature, such that
it is more efficient to the ends of the new (non-wealth-maximizing)
maximand than an equivalent taxing of F with associated transfer of
dollars to G.
Nevertheless, one might object that the fishery in this example has
been, given the contingencies of the new scheme, assigned to its highest
value user and therefore property law is best understood as remaining
under the “governance” of wealth maximization. In this vein, consider
the following: The fishery was assigned to G instead of another less
talented local group, G2, which is notorious for its fear of the water. This
assignment was made on the grounds that G would create more value by
engaging in subsistence fishing than would G2, who would fish
inefficiently due to their hydrophobia. This view, however, embodies a
failure to properly understand wealth maximization. The objection
appears to conflate an anti-waste dictum, or a mandate to meet the
difference principle efficiently, with wealth maximization. Imagine F’s
complaint against the new scheme. He complains that he has lost the
entitlement to the fishery, and that this loss is objectionable because the
new scheme fails to create property entitlements which maximize wealth.
The administrators of the new scheme would likely reply that the fishery
was reassigned in service to the difference principle, and the
reassignment was justified in terms of that governing principle. It was
made as a matter of the new, more equity-oriented commitment (an aim
of the new system, but not of the previous system). The point, however,
of F’s complaint is that the new arrangement fails to maximize wealth,
and given his talents, he objects to his place in the new scheme. However,
what has occurred is the reassignment of the fishery as a matter of
efficiently serving the new maximand.78

78. Different distributive principles require that distinct steps be taken in order to be satisfied
efficiently. See RAWLS, supra note 19, at 68 (“The principle of efficiency does not by itself select one
particular distribution of commodities as the efficient one. To select among the efficient distributions
some other principle, a principle of justice, say, is necessary.”).
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In response to this objection, importantly, the reassignment of the
fishery does not follow the pattern of wealth maximization.
Wealth maximization would assign the fishery to the least well-off if and
only if its value to the least well-off (L) was greater than its value to the
most talented person(s) (M) within the new scheme. However, if one is
seeking to satisfy the difference principle, it must be noted that if the
asset is assigned to the most talented, with the least well-off being
compensated via tax and transfer, the least well-off will benefit only by
tiM, where ti is the optimal income tax rate (with an associated “transfer”
rate of -ti) within the scheme that is applicable to that asset in the hands
of the most talented. In other words, given optimal tax policy, not all of
the value created by the assignment to the most talented is available to
benefit the least well-off. Thus, the assignment of the asset must be given
directly to the least well-off if L > tiM. To be clear, this is not the wealth
maximization decision-rule, in which the assignment is to the least well
off only if L > M. The objection cannot be sustained.
Kaplow and Shavell appear to not fully recognize the fixed role that
taxation and transfer must play in the context of maximizing schemes.
Our concern is perhaps most readily understood in the context of
constrained wealth maximization. Here, all non-basic legal and economic
institutions should be set to maximize wealth—this must, of course,
include the tax and transfer regime. To be clear, taxation in a wealth
maximization scheme is not zero;79 in order to achieve wealth
maximization, some tax revenue is needed, for example, for the creation
of public goods.80 Taxation in a wealth-maximizing scheme is higher than
it would be in the context of a political system designed to keep with the
doctrine of laissez-faire or libertarianism, and (presumably) lower than
it would be in the context of a Rawlsian distributive scheme maximizing
the position of the least well-off. Our point is that in the context of wealth
maximization, there is an optimal set of tax-policies, including optimal
tax rates that are necessitated by the maximand. There simply is little
“openness” in the context of a maximizing scheme for competing tax and
transfer schemes; again, tax policy including the optimal rate of taxation
is fixed by the maximand. If one is to maximize, it is crucial that all legal
rules be constructed in a nonarbitrary and instrumentalist fashion.
Zachary Liscow observes that, in the context of a wealth-maximizing
regime, pollution levels will be the same under both a negligence and

79. See, e.g., Joel Slemrod, Optimal Taxation and Optimal Tax Systems, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 157,
172 (1990); cf. Matthew Dimick, Should the Law Do Anything About Economic Inequality?,
26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 40 (2016) (“Since taxation can only reduce wealth, no taxation is
justified under the utilitarian’s preferences.”).
80. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954).
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strict liability tort regime.81 He then argues that if one is interested in
helping the poor, one should construct a strict liability regime, as that
will not, compared to negligence, affect pollution levels and will result in
more money in the hands of the poor. He describes this transfer as
“costless.”82
We have two objections. First, tort governs more than pollution
levels. It also affects, for example, investment decisions and incentives.
So, switching to strict liability, while it may not affect pollution levels, is
not costless, as it likely upsets wealth maximization along a number of
important dimensions, such as investment.
Second, the true analysis of the Kaplow and Shavell claim needs to
be inter-schemic, for example, between a full set of legal rules
constructed so as to maximize wealth versus the position of the least
well-off. His analysis does not account for the complete (re)arrangement
of legal entitlements that may be required in the face of a new maximand.
Instead he appears to assume the opposite: That in the context of a
maximand, legal rules can be altered in a globally cost free manner
(whatever the pollution level). Here, one must note that the factory may,
in the Rawlsian scheme, disappear, pollute more or less, and change what
counts as costs and benefits, and indeed as pollution. These are all
defined in terms of the maximand. None of these changes are “free”; each
is required in service of the new maximand, as deviations come at a cost.
In the context of a wealth-maximizing system, Liscow argues that a
factory would continue to pollute the same amount under both a
negligence and strict liability tort regime.83 In light of this, he holds that
money can be “costless[ly]” transferred to the poor via shifting tort
liability from negligence to strict liability.84 While it is plausible, as he
states, that factory owners are wealthier than those who live close to
polluting factories, importantly, it is not clear why this change in tort law
policy is “costless” from the perspective of wealth maximization. Tort
policy affects more than pollution levels, and such levels, in and of
themselves, are not the final aim of wealth maximization. As we have
said, the comparison, properly understood, is inter-schemic: A system of
legal rules constructed by wealth maximization on the one hand versus a
system of legal rules constructed by equity-oriented principles (such as
Rawls’s difference principle maximizing the position of the least well-off)
on the other. The factory may be shut down entirely, or the substance of
what is defined as pollution¾or baselines that determine what counts as
81. Zachary Liscow, Note, Reducing Inequality on the Cheap: When Legal Rule Design Should
Incorporate Equity as Well as Efficiency, 123 YALE L.J. 2478, 2486 (2014).
82. Id. at 2487.
83. Id. at 2486 (assuming “factories do not shut down”).
84. Id. at 2487.
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costs and benefits¾is likely to be altered in the new global
equity-oriented scheme.85
So the choice of tort policy is not “free,” as Liscow argues, but rather
mandated or required by the new, equity-oriented maximand. The very
quantum of pollution, the choice of tort liability and the value of the
factory are determined by the overarching maximand, so as to maximize,
say, the position of the least well-off. While it is true that a change in tort
liability may or may not be required, and true that such assignments are
properly “defined as distribution rather than redistribution” and perhaps
“perfect” where assigned in keeping with the maximand, Liscow’s
conclusion that such a change is “costless”86 simply does not follow. It
transfers a sum of money from the factory’s owners¾thus lowering the
value of the factory¾with all of its attendant distortions (from the
perspective of wealth maximization). In other words, while it is true that
torts are defined by the distributive scheme,87 and that such a
85. Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 8, at 1300–01 n.54 (“[T]he details of any protections
against economic harms the right against economic injury or harm are a function of property rules
that provide the relevant … baseline” and “the specific details of rights of ownership, transfer, and
compensation for harm require a property baseline … thus, economic aspects of the private law are …
constructed in service to the maximizing demands of the difference principle.”); Kordana &
Tabachnick, supra note 68, at 614–15:
One might question a “reliance on taxation and transfer to satisfy the demands of the
difference principle. It is not clear … that a Rawlsian must hold that the demands of the
difference principle are best met entirely through a system of taxation and transfer. Assume
for the sake of argument, as Rawls sometimes does, that the political institutions adopted
to meet the demands of the difference principle will include a market economy and a system
of private law. Assume further that the latter includes contract and tort law. It then is not
clear why contract and tort law cannot be leveraged to help in meeting the demands of the
difference principle. Political and legal institutions have complex and dynamic effects on
one another. It thus seems unlikely that an economic scheme that maximizes the position
of the least well-off would rely exclusively on tax and transfer for distribution. For example,
the manner in which the rules of tort law function may have dramatic effects on the position
of the least advantaged. To the extent that tort law is one of the means through which
accidents are deterred and accident victims are compensated, it seems that it (in addition
to tax) could be harnessed to meet the demands of the difference principle.
Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691 (2012) (discussing the import
of property baselines); Kahn & Lehman, supra note 64 (discussing entitlement baselines in the context
of the tax expenditure budget).
86. Liscow, supra note 81, at 2487.
87. Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 68, at 616–17 (There is no “reason for a Rawlsian to prefer
the exclusive use of tax and transfer for the achievement of distributional aims” nor is it even possible
to “distinguish between “taxation” and “other legal rules” . . . the very objects of taxation (for example,
property and income) are themselves post-institutionally created and defined by legal rules,”
distinctions “between property law, contract law, [tort law] and taxation . . . are blurred.” That is, “a
Rawlsian might plausibly view the required remittance of fifty percent of one’s wages to the
government as constituting “taxation” at a fifty-percent rate, but could also plausibly characterize that
remittance as instantiating a “property” rule.”); Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 8, at 1307 (“the
rules of tort law are constructed by the principles of justice in conjunction with all other bodies of law
so as to create a complete scheme of legal and political institution that is maximally instrumental to
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construction can transfer assets to the disadvantaged, such transfer
comes at a cost from the global wealth maximization perspective.
Liscow’s analysis may be seen as myopically focused on the
possibility of a “tie” in pollution levels when one compares strict liability
with negligence. He moves from the fact of a tie in pollution levels to the
conclusion that a change in private law rules is free. However, interschemically, a good deal more is at stake than mere pollution levels.
Unlike his belief, this is not only a distributive matter.88 Crucially, the
selection of tort policy affects total wealth. While choice of tort policy may
not alter pollution activity intra-schemically, it is not free.
It appears that Liscow achieves a tie in pollution by holding crucial
incentive effects of the competing schemes of legal rules constant,
thereby inadvertently disabling the competing maximands. His example
produces a tie with regard to pollution levels only, owing to the well
understood, if counterintuitive, fact that, all else being constant, changes
in private law rules cannot guarantee alteration in pollution activity
levels.
But, all else is not constant in the face of alternative maximands.
Again, the proper analysis is between complete schemes of legal rules and
their respective governing maximands. Tort policy aims to govern more
than just pollution levels. It is also a mechanism of wealth creation and
distribution and their many component parts: for example, investment
decisions and spreading the costs of accidents. Since choice of tort policy
is not free globally, Liscow has not demonstrated that alterations in
private law rules are more efficient than income taxation and transfer in
achieving equity oriented demands, as Kaplow and Shavell maintain.
D. MAXIMIZING PRINCIPLES AND THE DEMAND FOR OPTIMAL TAX RATES
Any assumption that tax and transfer can be “freely” invoked to
bring the entire scheme of legal rules into compliance with the maximand
is unwarranted. The point is that, in terms of the relentless demands of
wealth maximization, any moves away from optimal taxation are not cost
free. Such moves produce significant economic distortion which would
prevent the entire scheme from maximizing. It is not the case that any
failure to maximize wealth in expansive property law rules can simply be
efficiently “compensated” through the use of tax and transfer by raising

the demands of the principles of justice” and “principles of justice enjoin only the conclusion that the
entire scheme best meets the demands of the principles of justice.”).
88. Liscow, supra note 81, at 2487 (“Although there is no difference in the behavior of the
polluter, there is a difference in the distribution of money.”).
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or lowering income taxation.89 If one is to maximize, all legal rules need
to be set to wealth maximization, with significant attention to optimal tax
policy; given the maximand, there is simply little latitude in this regard.
Return now to the context of a system governed by the difference
principle. Here, of course, the goal is not to create the greatest net
aggregate wealth, but rather to maximize the size of the smallest
distributive share, compared with all other possible schemes of legal and
economic rules. Notably, there is no demand to maximize the net
aggregate size of the total economic “pie”; indeed, the goal of maximizing
the position of the least well-off is in significant conflict with the aim of
maximizing net aggregate wealth, a goal which is indifferent to any
distributive pattern. Nevertheless, taxation functions in an analogous
fashion: given the maximand, there must be an optimal level of
taxation.90 Again, tax policy, inclusive of tax rates, is not “open” or “free”;
it must be set instrumentally in service to the demands of the difference
principle. The point is that departures in taxation from optimal tax policy
will cause significant economic distortions (for example, less than

89. See MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 52, at 136 (“[Optimal taxation’s] central question is what
level of taxation would best promote welfare (either weighted in favor of the worse off or not), given
the welfare losses caused by the behavioral effects of the income tax.”).
90. Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 68, at 150 (“arguments about property, contract,
bankruptcy, and tax policy per se are moot . . . maximizing theorist[s] needs to select bankruptcy policy
as part of the overall scheme that best satisfies the distributive principles . . . the maximizing scheme
has obliterated the principled distinction between [all private law rules] and taxation . . . .”); Kordana
& Tabachnick, supra note 68, at 614 (“given Rawls’s post-institutional conception of property, taxation
is not a matter of redistribution, as it is typically understood in our public lexicon, but rather a matter
of distribution.”); David H. Blankfein-Tabachnick, Intellectual Property Doctrine and Midlevel
Principles, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1315, 1347 (2013) (“In selecting legal rules and institutions, there is not
much latitude, given the maximizing demands of the distributive principles. Maximizing principles
require a specific set of property rules conjoined with an optimal tax rate . . . The important insight
can be pushed a step further, the conception of what is optimal changes when one shifts between
maximands. What is optimal for a utilitarian regime (maximizing net aggregate utility) cannot also be
optimal for a Rawlsian (maximizing the position of the least well-off).”); David Blankfein-Tabachnick,
Property, Duress and Consensual Relationships, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1013, 1027 (2016) (details
of
ownership and . . . economic exchange…in conjunction with contract law, property, and the system of
taxation and transfer . . . [are] components[s] of the complete set of economic institutions.”); cf.
Dimick, supra note 79, at 12 n.41:
This also strongly affects whether the legal system or the tax system should be used to
redistribute income. Depending on how much society or a policy-maker is willing to reduce
inequality, an inefficient legal redistribution may or may not be a preferable
alternative . . . An inefficient legal redistribution may reduce inequality more, but may
deliver lower social welfare because of greater economic distortions. In contrast, this same
legal redistribution may well be superior to the optimal tax policy under a Rawlsian social
welfare function, which creates larger economic distortions.
Dimick recognizes that alternative distributive goals demand changes to tax policy but seemingly fails
to recognize that in a Rawlsian legal scheme tax and property rules must be set in conjunction with
one another for optimal taxation to obtain, due to the unyielding demands of the maximand. This
causes Dimick to erroneously tinker with what he describes as “optimal tax” in the Rawlsian scheme.
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efficient maximization of the position of the least well-off). In other
words, tax policy is not available to “undo” the consequences of other
non-optimal legal rules in terms of meeting the demands of the
maximand (that is, the valueless, in the hands of F, fishery in the new
difference-principle-oriented scheme).
E.

PROPERTY ALLOCATIONS AND PROPERTY LAW RULES

Return now to the fishery example, where another possible response
from a proponent of the Kaplow and Shavell claim would perhaps be that
a property “allocation” (that is, who owns the fishery) has changed, but
that “property law rules” need not change. In the wealth-maximizing
scheme, property law rules consistent with the maximand were crafted.
Now, in the new scheme, one might maintain, under that same rubric, F
would sell the fishery to G, on the grounds that it was no longer valuable
to him since his talent for caviar production is irrelevant now that the
industry has collapsed; however, the fishery is of some value to G. Thus,
it could be maintained that the “rules” or doctrines of property law have
not been altered in the new scheme, only particular property
“allocations” have been changed. Arguably, given the insights of the
Coase Theorem, the fishery will be given to the highest value user in the
new scheme, G, without requiring a change in property law rules.
Such an argument, however, ignores the fact that it is implausible
that the new scheme can afford to rely on consensual transactions, across
all non-tax and transfer legal rules, in order to best satisfy the demands
of the difference principle. Neither wealth-maximizers nor proponents of
the Rawlsian difference principle are committed in principle to
consensual transactions, as found in Lockean-libertarianism. Both would
be required to assign property entitlements in an instrumentalist
fashion, given the demands of their respective maximands in situations
where voluntary transacting would not yield as efficient (to the goals of
the scheme) a result.91 So, for example, wealth maximization would

91. Kordana & Tabachnick, supra note 68, at 598, 600 (“[f]or the Rawlsian, contract law is a
matter of (re)distribution, consistent with a post-institutional right to freedom of contract . . . freedom
of contract, for Rawlsianism, is to be defined as the scheme of contracting options constructed as open
or free (in the post-institutional sense) in conjunction with the overall scheme of legal and political
institutions that, when taken as a whole, best serves the demands of the two principles of justice”).
Consider, for example, the Gautreaux case, where section 8 housing vouchers were provided to the
poor in an attempt to achieve the goal of “deconcentration” in the urban ghetto. This aim was thought
to be achievable only under the rubric of entitlement rules that had been altered so as to meet a
distributive aim; the acceptance of section 8 housing vouchers on the part of landlords is mandatory,
as opposed to being left open to fully consensual market transactions. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284
(1976). For discussion on deconcentration, see Owen M. Fiss, What Should Be Done for Those Who
Have Been Left Behind, in A WAY OUT: AMERICA’S GHETTOS AND THE LEGACY OF RACISM 34 (Joshua
Cohen et al. eds., 2003) (“Putting an end to the social dynamics that have transformed the ghetto over
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assign air rights to airlines rather than landowners, so as to avoid the loss
of wealth-creating flying occurring in a scheme in which air rights
remained bundled with land rights in a fee simple.
Imagine that in a wealth-maximizing scheme a certain asset was to
be allocated to an entrepreneur on the grounds of her being able to best
utilize the asset. Due to decreased net aggregate wealth, that particular
opportunity is no longer available in the new scheme governed by the
Rawlsian difference principle, as was the case in the caviar fishery
example above, where an alternative use of the fishery was necessitated.
This necessitates a change in the expansive property rules which govern
allocations. G’s lack of skill or capital cannot as efficiently be overcome
through an infusion of tax dollars; as a mandatory asset allocation is, in
our example, less costly, while introducing additional taxation to pay for
additional transfer to G itself introduces further distortions (see chart
below, row 4).
Our argument, then, is that, if assets are, in the new scheme
governed by the difference principle, left assigned as they were in the
previous wealth-maximizing scheme because following Kaplow and
Shavell’s dictum, no changes would be made to any legal rules other than
income taxation and transfer, the new scheme will fail to maximize the
position of the least well-off (see chart below, row 2). The reason for this
is that given the decrease in net aggregate wealth in the new scheme,
some assets have decreased in value such that their reassignment is now
required in order to satisfy the new maximand. Attempting to tax the
income derived from the asset in its original assignment in order to
transfer income to the least well-off cannot possibly satisfy the new
scheme’s maximand as compared to directly reassigning the asset (see
chart below, row 1). Thus, the expansive rules of property law must,
contra Kaplow and Shavell’s dictum, be reconstructed in response to the
new distributive principle.

the last . . . forty years into a structure of subordination would require . . . many deep interventions
into the life of that community”).
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S 1:
Constrained
Wealth
Maximization
Governing All
Legal Rules

S 2:
Kaplow and Shavell’s
position: Difference
Principle governing
Taxation and
Transfer as sole
instrument for
Equity-Oriented
Distributive Aim;
Other Legal Rules
Remain as in S1

S 3:
Our position:
Difference
Principle
Governing All
Legal Rules with
Some Property
Reassignments;
No Commitment
to S1 Rules

100

50

70

10

15

17

50

30

31

20%

60%

55%

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

We are now in a position to discuss the scope of our claim that
changes in expansive property law can dominate changes in income
taxation and transfer when satisfying equity-oriented demands. Consider
first a scheme which maximizes net aggregate wealth. Assets will be
assigned to their highest value use.92 That is, an asset’s ownership
entitlement will be assigned to the person(s) who will use it to create the
most wealth. The asset’s entitlement could be assigned to other
person(s), but all such persons would provide less (or, perhaps on
occasion, the same) wealth, and so such potential assignments would be
rejected in favor of the wealth-maximizing assignment. Keep in mind
that in maximizing net aggregate wealth, distributive justice-oriented
patterns are ignored.
Now consider a second scheme, with a different distributive
principle in place¾the quasi-Rawlsian difference principle, maximizing

92. Assignments occur either directly, if the assumptions of the Coase Theorem are not in place
such that initial entitlements are crucial, or through the operation of consensual transactions if the
alienability of particular assets is instrumental to wealth maximization.
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the position of the least well-off.93 With respect to a particular asset, that
asset might be left assigned to the person(s) who owned it in the first
scheme. Importantly, because the difference principle will inevitably
result in a scheme with less net aggregate wealth than in the
wealth-maximizing scheme, those who used the asset to create the most
wealth in the original scheme may no longer serve to maximize wealth
with the asset in the new scheme. Additionally, the amount of wealth
generated by the allocation of the asset to particular person(s) will also
likely be different than in the first scheme (on average, it will be lower,
given that the scheme is overall less wealthy, but on occasion a particular
asset might be worth more in the difference principle scheme than it was
under wealth maximization).
Alternatively, the asset might be reassigned to some new person(s)
on grounds that such assignment is useful to satisfying the demands of
the scheme’s maximand. The new maximand demands that the position
of the least well-off be improved, and one way to do this is to assign
property to them. Another way is to assign the property to a high-value
user who will produce enough wealth with it that, given the optimal tax
to be applied to that asset, it will result in a transfer to the least well-off
that improves their position. The original assignment of the asset was not
made with this result in mind; it therefore may not be the assignment
that is instrumental to the maximization of the least well-off’s position.
Therefore, and crucially, the income “delivered” to the least well-off by
the reassignment of the asset may generate, in that scheme, both more
net income and more income to the least well-off than does the original
assignment (see chart above, columns 2 and 3).
Take, for example, ML the mediocre lawyer. In a wealth-maximizing
scheme, ML is assigned to BigLaw on the grounds that he contributes
more net aggregate wealth (say, $200,000) under this assignment than
under all other assignments, including his next best assignment, which
is as a teacher (say, $180,000). Now, consider the situation when the
distributive principle has been changed. Assume that ML continues to
create the most net aggregate wealth if he remains assigned to BigLaw.
However, since taxes have been increased in order to generate revenue
to transfer to the least well-off, net aggregate wealth has decreased, as
compared to the initial scheme. As a result ML’s assignment to BigLaw

93. Note that our analysis remains the same if the new equity-orientation required the satisfaction
of some “fixed” goal, such as the provision of a “decent social minimum” to all. The new scheme,
subject to such a goal, is still a constrained maximizing scheme (that is, wealth maximization, now
subject to both the basic entitlement constraint and the decent social minimum constraint). Again, the
new scheme drops below the wealth maximization ceiling, relative prices change, and the
reassignment of some assets is required in order to meet the demands of the (constrained) maximizing
distributive principle.
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now contributes less net aggregate wealth (say, $100,000) than it did in
the initial scheme.
In the alternative, ML might be assigned to teaching. This
contributes even less net aggregate wealth (say, $90,000) than his
assignment to BigLaw. Importantly, however, the distribution of that
wealth differs. Assume for simplicity that ML’s salary is the same in
either assignment (say, $40,000), but that BigLaw benefits by $60,000
while his students benefit by $50,000 if he teaches. If the students
constitute the least well-off, and if the optimal tax rate on BigLaw is, say,
ti=67%, then his assignment to BigLaw only improves the position of the
least well-off by $40,000. Crucially, an equity-oriented tax scheme is not
merely a matter of redividing the revenue derived from a
wealth-maximizing scheme since net aggregate wealth decreases when
income taxation increases as would be demanded by the new distributive
principle. The direct assignment of ML to teaching satisfies the demands
of the difference principle; his assignment to BigLaw fails to do so. The
difference principle scheme mandates his reassignment to teaching. It is
not possible that the failure to increase the position of the least well-off
by assigning ML to teaching can be compensated by instead assigning
ML to what would be his position in a wealth-maximizing scheme,
BigLaw. Such an assignment produces an additional $10,000 of wealth,
but that is insufficient, given the scheme’s optimal tax regime, to provide
enough revenue for transfer to the least well-off so as to, as the scheme
demands, maximize their position. Thus, the expansive rules of property
law must reflect the new equity-orientation of the scheme. Kaplow and
Shavell’s tax and transfer preference is unfounded.
Of course, sometimes income taxation and transfer is the preferred
instrument. If ML were a terrific rather than a mediocre lawyer he might
well remain with the BigLaw assignment even as the maximand shifted
(that is, if he produces enough more wealth as a lawyer versus as a
teacher). Analogously, if ML is an outstanding teacher then the
assignment of ML to teaching might be the best assignment under both
maximands. It is the conjunction of his being a mediocre lawyer and a
reasonable teacher that leads the wealth-maximizing scheme to assign
him to BigLaw, thus creating a slightly wealthier society, while the
equity-oriented scheme instead better achieves its goal of maximizing the
position of the least well-off by harnessing his talents at teaching.
IV. THE DEMAND FOR FORMAL EQUALITY AND THE USE OF
PRIVATE LAW RULES AS EQUITY-ORIENTED INSTRUMENTS
A standard objection to the use of private law instruments for
equity-oriented aims, perhaps, is that adjudication based on the relative
wealth of parties in civil litigation is a violation of what one might call
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formal equality. That is, the relative wealth of litigants should, as a matter
of fundamental legality, be understood as irrelevant because an arbitrary
quality of the litigants, such as race or sex. The objection invites the
conclusion that the use of private law rules for equity-oriented purposes
would lead to unjustifiably unequal treatment of civil litigants.
Our response to this objection is twofold. First, the objection fails to
recognize that the outcome of any civil litigation is contingent upon
property baselines; civil litigation often is the very question of which
property baselines ought to be adopted and why. Taking property
assignments as given, conventional or “natural” is to adopt a conception
of entitlement. However, the question in civil litigation is often over the
warrant or justification for such entitlement arrangements.
Second, though closely related, the objection that achieving equityoriented aims through private law rules yields unequal treatment is
addressed at the wrong level. The establishment of private law rules, like
the setting of income taxation rates, is not, in the first instance, about
particular litigating parties, but rather is a matter of general institutional
design or rulemaking. The manner in which private law rules are
constructed (for example, the first-in-time-rule,94 the choice of limited
versus unlimited liability for business enterprises,95 the relative
preference of tort versus contract creditors in bankruptcy,96 or the
demand for unitization where landowners’ interests conflict in
oil-drilling97) are to be determined according to the demands of
overarching distributive principles or aims which govern the scheme.
Raising an objection from “inequality” to an aspect of the scheme
must sound in a differing conception or principled account of equality
from that embodied in the scheme. Where private law rules are set to
keep with fully justified government aims, or governed by morally or
politically justifiable distributive principles, the mere fact of differential
treatment of parties is insufficient to raise a claim of unjustifiable or
wrongful inequality; the objection is addressed to the wrong level. Our
point is that once one acknowledges that a scheme of legal and political
rules is fully justified by morally acceptable overarching distributive
aims, which themselves embody a conception of equality, one cannot

94. E.g., Pierson v. Post, 3 CAI. R. 175, 178–80 (N.Y. 1805) (constructing a rule that hot pursuit of
a wild animal does not create any rights in the pursuer). For a discussion of the socioeconomic clash
between the parties in this classic case, see Bethany R. Berger, It’s Not About the Fox: The Untold
History of Pierson v. Post, 55 DUKE L.J. 1089 (2006).
95. E.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 100 YALE L.J. 1879 (1991).
96. E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996).
97. E.g., Steven N. Wiggins & Gary D. Libecap, Oil Field Unitization: Contractual Failure in the
Presence of Imperfect Information, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 368 (1985).
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coherently raise an objection of unjust inequality simply owing to the fact
of nonequivalent treatment. Any difference in treatment is justified by
the distributive principles, which define a conception of equality. Any
objection needs to be addressed to the governing principles themselves,
as opposed to the outcome of the application of legal rules designed
instrumentally in service to the principles’ demands. In this, private law
rules are identical to income taxation in all relevant respects.
To be clear, for example, the question of whether tort creditors
should be given preference over contract creditors (as they presently are
not) in bankruptcy is a question coherently answered only by appeal to
distributive goals. If one accepts, for instance, the wealth maximization
principle and also acknowledges that wealth can be maximized if and
only if tort creditors are given such preference in bankruptcy so as to
provide a disincentive to externalize costs, it would be incoherent to then
raise an objection on behalf of contract creditors owing to disparate
treatment at trial. Such bankruptcy preference rules are governed by
distributive principles which define the conception of equality; disparate
treatment is insufficient to demonstrate an unjustifiable outcome.
CONCLUSION
Equity-oriented distributive goals are not always more efficiently
achieved via income taxation and transfer rather than private law rules.
This claim, chiefly associated with Kaplow and Shavell, is not about the
acceptability of equity-oriented political values or distributive patterns,
but rather, the most economically efficient manner of achieving such
ends. Were Kaplow and Shavell correct in this claim, equity-oriented
private law constructions would be best understood as inefficient means
of achieving equity-oriented ends. As a matter of institutional design,
such equity-oriented aims would be more efficiently achieved via the use
of income taxation and transfer, while at the same time constructing
private law rules in a manner in keeping with constrained wealth
maximization. We have shown that Kaplow and Shavell’s conclusion in
favor of the tax and transfer preference, however prominent, is
significantly problematic. Their claim fails to acknowledge the crucial
efficiency role that property law entitlements must play in achieving any
distributive end, equity-oriented or otherwise. We have shown that once
this point is recognized, the tax and transfer preference no longer holds.
Maximally efficient institutional design at times requires that equityoriented demands be met through the private law rules of property and
that income taxation and transfer is not always superior in its efficiency
to such constructions.
Given the maximizing goal, no rules can be ignored, that is, merely
“taken as they are found” in any actual conventional property scheme.
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What is needed is the selection of the complete scheme of legal and
political rules which maximizes the position of the least well-off in
comparison to all other possible schemes. In this inter-schemic
comparison, failing to consider altering the full range of legal rules
simply because they are, for some unstated exogenous reason, to be taken
as conventional or merely as they are found, is to fail to maximize, that
is, fail to implement the distributive principle. For example, it is our
understanding that takings cases represent the altering of property
entitlements in service to distributive aims.98
Kaplow and Shavell’s analysis appears to focus on changes to specific rules
within an otherwise fixed scheme, without comment on the nature of the
remainder of the scheme’s other legal rules, specifically the structure of the
details of ownership. In other words, their analysis seems to be intraschemic rather than inter-schemic: It contrasts changes of specific rules
within a single scheme as opposed to the relative comparison of competing
complete schemes.99 Therefore, their analysis seems not to recognize that
once a change in maximand (that is, the difference principle versus wealth
maximization) is adopted, all rules must be constructed in its service. The
conclusion that tax and transfer is more efficient than other legal rules in
achieving equity-oriented ends requires inter-schemic comparisons among
complete schemes of legal and political rules.

98. Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104 (1978); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
99. See POGGE, supra note 67, at 71.
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